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Abstract. The integration of photon-counting imaging techniques and 
optical encryption systems can improve information authentication 
robustness against intruder attacks. Photon-counting imaging generates 
distributions with far fewer photons than conventional imaging, and 
provides substantial bandwidth reduction by generating a sparse 
encrypted data. We show that photon-limited encrypted distributions 
have sufficient information for successful decryption, authentication and 
signal retrieval. Additional compression of the encrypted distribution is 
applied by limiting the number of phase values used to reproduce the 
phase information of the complex-valued encrypted data. The validity of 
this technique – with and without phase compression – is probed through 
simulated experiments for two types of input images: alphanumerical 
signs and dithered natural scenes. 
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1. Introduction 
Recently, a proposal to integrate the photon-counting imaging technique with optical 
encryption was presented in Ref. [1]. A photon-limited version of an encrypted 
distribution, which consists of a sparse representation of the encrypted information, is 
considered. This sparse representation is used for decryption and, as a result, a noisy 
decrypted signal, which is not recognizable by visual inspection, is retrieved. By 
following this procedure, intruders cannot easily recognize the decrypted image 
retrieved from the sparse encrypted distribution since it is not intended for visualization 
of the primary image, but for verification of the information by means of optical 
correlation. Thus, the integration of photon-counting techniques along with double-
random-phase encryption (DRPE) [2] introduces an additional layer of information 
protection that increases the system security and makes the verification process more 
robust against unauthorized attacks. Other DRPE-based authentication techniques that 
utilize multiple images, biometric information and near-infrared remote sensing have 
been developed for a secure multifactor verification [3-4]. 
In this paper, we further analyse the possibility of combining photon-counting imaging 
and optical encryption following two alternative schemes for the integration of both 
techniques. Photon-counting imaging can be applied to the encrypted function as 
proposed in the previous work [1]. Another approach presented in this work is to apply 
photon-counting imaging to the primary image prior to its encryption. This paper 
provides numerical results that show the effect of the reduction of the number of 
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photons on the verification process and the possibility of reducing the information of 
the encrypted distribution without affecting the system security. Even though the 
integration of photon-counting imaging and DRPE was first intended for information 
verification and not for image visualization, in this paper we present the additional 
possibility of image retrieval based on the pattern identification obtained from a peaky 
correlation signal.  
Section 2 contains a brief description of both, the photon-counting imaging and the 
DRPE techniques. Section 3 provides a detailed description of the integration 
procedure, along with the numerical results that evaluate its technical implementation. 
Finally, algorithms for information verification and image retrieval are presented in 
Section 4, prior the conclusions of the work. 
 
2. Background: Photon-Counting Imaging (PhCI); Double-Random-Phase 
Encryption (DRPE) 
2.1 Photon-counting imaging 
In photon-counting imaging (PhCI) systems, images can have a limited number of 
photons by controlling the expected number of incident photons (counts) in the entire 
scene, Np  [1,5]. Thus, in general, a photon-limited image has less information than the 
original counterpart. The probability of counting l j  photons at pixel x j  can be shown to 
be Poisson distributed [6] 
 Pd l j ;α j( ) = α j
⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
l j e−α j
l j !
, l j = 0,1,2...  (1) 
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where l j  is the number of photons detected at pixel x j  and the Poisson parameter α j  is 
given by α j = Npg xj( )  with g xj( )  being the normalized irradiance at pixel x j  such 
that g xj( ) = 1
j=1
M
∑  and M  the total number of pixels in the scene. 
Figure 1(a) shows a binary image used in the experiments presented in this work. Along 
with the original primary image, several photon-limited versions are provided in Figure 
1(b) to illustrate the effect of limiting the number of photons Np  that reach the image. 
Photon-limited versions shown in Figure 1(b) hardly reveal the original appearance of 
the primary image (Fig. 1(a)). For Np = 104 , which approximately corresponds to 4% 
of the primary image pixel size, it is possible to slightly make out a text structure on the 
photon-limited image. 
Photon-counting imaging techniques have been applied in many fields and in different 
spectral bandwidths [5,7-11]. 2D image recognition using photon-limited distributions 
has also been demonstrated [7-8]. The photon-counting approach on 3D object 
recognition has recently been investigated [5,11].  
 
2.2 Double-random-phase encryption 
According to the DRPE algorithm [2], a primary image f x( )  can turn up to be a noisy-
like complex-valued distribution ψ x( )  that does not reveal its content, when two 
random phase masks, exp i2πn x( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦  and exp i2πb µ( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦  with n x( )  and b µ( )  
uniformly distributed over 0,1[ ] , are used in the spatial and Fourier domains, 
respectively, as it is mathematically described by  
 ψ x( ) = f x( )exp i2πn x( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦{ }∗h x( ) , (2) 
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where h x( ) = FT −1 exp i2πb µ( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦{ }  and FT −1  stands for the inverse Fourier transform. 
Symbol ∗  in Eq. (2) denotes convolution, and coordinates x( )  and µ( )  correspond to 
the spatial and frequency domains, respectively, in one-dimensional notation for 
simplicity. 
By multiplying the Fourier transformed encrypted distribution, FT ψ x( ){ } , by the 
decryption key, exp −i2πb µ( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ , the original primary image can be retrieved provided 
f x( )  is a real and positive function.  
Since the introduction of the DRPE algorithm [2], a variety of other proposals based on 
this encoding technique have been published, leading DRPE and its variants to be one 
of the most widespread techniques applied in the optical security field (for a review, see 
for instance, Ref. [12]). In parallel to novel DRPE variant proposals, a number of papers 
have demonstrated certain vulnerability of the DRPE method due to the fact that is a 
linear process that facilitates some kinds of attacks [12-14]. DRPE is much more secure 
when employed in optical systems because it frequently involves some nonlinear effects 
and additional experimental parameters (optical storage materials, positions, wavelength 
and polarization of the light beam) that need to be known precisely to retrieve the 
hidden information. However, since the DRPE can be seen as a cryptographic algorithm 
that can be alternatively implemented digitally, it is found to be resistant against brute 
force attacks but vulnerable to known and chosen plaintext and ciphertext attacks [12-
14]. For this reason, new methods have been proposed in the last recent years to 
increase the security of this optical encryption procedure. Among them, the integration 
of DRPE with photon-counting imaging techniques has been published in 2011 [1].  
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3. PhCI and DRPE integration  
3.1 Two integration procedures 
In this Section, two alternative integrating procedures of the photon-counting imaging 
and the encryption techniques are detailed and compared (Figure 2). The main 
difference between the two combinations is in the order in which the two techniques are 
applied. On the one hand, the photon-counting imaging technique is applied to the real-
valued primary image f x( ) . For this approach, marked with (I) PhCI+DRPE in Figure 
(2), a photon-limited primary image fph x( )  is obtained by applying Eq. (1) to the 
normalized distribution g x( ) = f x( ) f x j( )
j=1
M
∑ . Afterwards, the photon-limited image 
fph x( )  can be further secured by encrypting this sparse information with the DRPE 
method (Eq. 2). The decrypted information obtained following such a procedure is 
named d fph x( ) . On the other hand, the primary image f x( )  is first encrypted using Eq. 
(2) to produce the distribution ψ x( ) . In this approach, marked with (II) DRPE+PhCI in 
Fig. (2), the photon-counting imaging technique is applied to the complex-valued 
encrypted distribution ψ x( ) . Taking into account that the encrypted distribution is, in 
general, of complex nature, both amplitude and phase must be kept for decryption. The 
photon-counting imaging technique is first applied to the amplitude information, so that 
it turns to be a binary distribution. Thus, the photon-limited amplitude encrypted 
distribution, ψ ph x( ) , is generated from the normalized amplitude distribution 
g x( ) = ψ x( ) ψ x j( )
j=1
M
∑  using Eq. (1). Only the non-zero amplitude pixels keep the 
phase information for decryption. The phase information is distributed from 0 to  
with a resolution of 8 bits at this stage. From the photon-limited amplitude and its 
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corresponding phase information, a photon-limited encrypted function, ψ ph x( ) , is 
obtained and used for decryption. The final decrypted image is called dψ ph x( ) .  
If one compares the two decrypted images obtained by both procedures (functions 
d fph x( )  and dψ ph x( )  in Figure 3), it is possible to realise that the first one, d fph x( ) , 
consists of a sparse distribution of a photon-limited version of the primary image, while 
the latter, dψ ph x( ) , has a noisy-like appearance with higher intensity on average than 
the former. In both cases, the decoded images hardly resemble the original primary 
image f x( )  and, as a consequence, the text contained in it cannot be recognised. Let us 
recall, that the integration of PhCI and DRPE is not intended for visualization of the 
decrypted information, but for verification. 
It is worth mentioning the fact that an effective bandwidth reduction can be achieved 
only from the second integration procedure (II – DRPE+PhCI in Fig. 2) that consists of 
firstly encrypting the primary image, and secondly obtaining a photon-counting imaging 
version of the encrypted distribution. In such a case, the reduction in the number of 
pixels considered in the transmission and decryption processes benefits from the 
number of photon-counts taken into account in the PhCI technique. The information 
contained in this sparse representation can be significantly compressed by keeping only 
the data of the no-null information, similarly to the procedure presented in Ref. [15]. If 
the first procedure is applied (I – PhCI+DRPE in Fig. 2), the photon-counting imaging 
technique is used to obtain a photon-limited primary image, and this resulting 
distribution is then encrypted with DRPE obtaining a non-sparse complex-valued 
function. In such a situation, no information reduction and therefore, no benefit is 
achieved in comparison to the DRPE technique.  
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To authenticate the retrieved signal d x( ) , which is either d fph x( )  or dψ ph x( ) , we 
compare it with the original image f x( )  used as a reference, by nonlinear correlation 
[16]. Nevertheless, a number of other recognition techniques may be used [17-19]. The 
signals to be compared are Fourier transformed, nonlinearly modified and multiplied in 
the frequency domain. By inverse Fourier transforming this product, the nonlinear 
correlation c x( )  between both signals is obtained [16] 
 
c x( ) = FT −1 D µ( )F µ( ) k exp i φD µ( ) −φF µ( )( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦{ } , (3) 
where the uppercase denotes Fourier transform of the function in lowercase. 
In a k 'th-law processor, parameter k  defines the strength of the applied nonlinearity. 
For k = 1  a linear filtering technique is obtained, whereas k = 0  leads to a phase 
extractor that generally enhances the high frequency content. Intermediate values of k  
permit the features of the processor to be varied. Thus, features such as discrimination 
capability, noise robustness or peak sharpness can be chosen according to the 
performance required for a given recognition task [16,20-21]. In this work, we will 
provide computer simulations to establish the value of parameter k  best suited to our 
verification application. We will analyse the performance of the processor in terms of 
the discrimination ratio (DR ) metrics [18] 
 DR = 1− CCAC , (4) 
where CC  stands for the maximum cross-correlation intensity value of the output 
correlation plane when a given signal is correlated with the reference primary function, 
and AC  stands for the maximum auto-correlation intensity value obtained when the 
reference primary image is correlated with itself. This expression can be adapted to the 
photon-couting imaging technique to deal with large differences in intensity maxima 
that usually occur. In Eq. (4), as auto-correlation we take ACph , which is the output 
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correlation intensity maximum obtained when the primary image f x( )  is correlated 
with d x( ) , that is the decrypted signal retrieved by any of the integrating procedures 
described above, either d fph x( )  or dψ ph x( ) , applied to the authorized primary image. In 
case of the cross-correlation signal, we consider CCph , which is the output correlation 
intensity maximum obtained when the same procedures are applied to the correlation of 
the primary image f x( )  with a different non-authorized primary image, let us denote it 
by  
f x( )  (Figure 4).  A DR = 0.5  is chosen as an arbitrary reference to allow a good 
discrimination between the original and the unauthorized primary images. DR  values 
below the threshold level of 0.5 indicate that the evaluated image is considered as the 
sought signal, whereas DR > 0.5  indicates discrimination of the analysed image from 
the reference.  
 
3.2 Evaluation results 
Figure 3 shows the retrieved images, d fph x( )  and dψ ph x( ) , obtained using both 
procedures (I and II of Fig. 2) for photon-counting and encryption integration when the 
original primary image, f x( ) , which is the authorized signal, is the input in both 
processes. A number of photon counts of Np = 102.5 , which corresponds to 0.12% of the 
image size, is set for the photon limited version of the primary image (procedure I - 
PhCI+DRPE). For the case of photon limiting the encrypted distribution (procedure II - 
DRPE+PhCI) Np = 104 , or equivalently, less than 4% of the image size, is considered. 
Decoded images are compared to the primary image through nonlinear correlation with 
k = 0.3  and the corresponding intensity autocorrelation outputs are shown in Figure 4. 
In order to test the discrimination capability of the proposed system, a different but 
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highly similar text image  
f x( ) , which is a non-authorized signal, is used in the 
described procedures. This text has exactly the same amount of white pixels as the 
correct primary image (Fig. 4). According to the proposals, function  
f x( )  is either first 
photon-limited and then encrypted (procedure I – PhCI+DRPE in Fig. 2) or, first 
encrypted and then photon-limited (procedure II – DRPE+PhCI in Fig. 2), and by using 
the appropriate decrypting key, the decoded images  
d fph x( )  and  
dψ ph x( )  are retrieved, 
respectively. Both decrypted images look like their corresponding counterparts, d fph x( )  
and dψ ph x( ) . Neither the sparse distributions nor the noisy-like images do permit to 
make out the original text by direct visual inspection in any of the cases. However, we 
can compare the retrieved images  
d fph x( )  and  
dψ ph x( )  with the original primary image 
f x( )  through nonlinear correlation to verify their authenticity. The corresponding 
intensity crosscorrelation outputs are shown in Figure 4 as well. From these results, we 
can state that even the amount of information kept in the decoded images is insufficient 
to recognise the original text by the naked eye, it is enough to discriminate between 
them through optical correlation, as it can be tested from the normalized intensity 
correlation outputs obtained in this experiment. Only correlation planes corresponding 
to the authorized primary image contain a high and sharp intensity peak, whereas the 
correlation planes corresponding to the non-authorized signal provide a low intensity 
noisy distribution over the whole planes without any remarkable correlation peak. These 
results are shown as examples of the outputs obtained for the proposed verification 
system, and they were obtained for a given number of photons on the photon-limited 
distributions (Np = 102.5  or equivalently 0.12% of the image pixels for the procedure I - 
PhCI+DRPE and Np = 104  or 3.8% of the image pixels for the procedure II - 
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DRPE+PhCI) and a particular value of parameter k  ( k = 0.3 ) that defines the applied 
nonlinearity in the correlation. We must remark that for the case of applying the photon-
counting imaging techniques directly to the primary binary image (procedure I - 
PhCI+DRPE), it is possible to significantly reduce the number of photons Np = 102.5( ) , 
in comparison to procedure II - DRPE+PhCI with the photon-limited version of the 
encrypted distribution Np = 104( ) . For the latter, the random noisy appearance of the 
encrypted information requires a larger amount of photons to obtain a successful 
verification of the information. Regarding the possibility of achieving a bandwidth 
reduction for information transmission, only one procedure permits an effective 
reduction of the information, which is to consider the photon-limited sparse encrypted 
distribution, ψ ph x( ) , of procedure II – DRPE+PhCI (Figure 2). Procedure I – 
PhCI+DRPE (Fig. 2), which consists of encrypting the photon-limited primary image, 
fph x( ) , contains complex-valued information corresponding to all the pixels of the 
original primary image. In that sense, no bandwidth reduction is achieved.  
To select the most appropriate applied nonlinear correlation, the discrimination ratio 
was evaluated for several values of parameter k . Figure 5 shows the obtained results for 
the binary text images, being f x( )  the authorized signal and  f x( )  the non-authorized 
image, both shown in Fig. 4. The corresponding decrypted signals, d x( )  and  d x( )  
respectively, are compared with the original primary image f x( )  so that ACph  and 
CCph  are obtained. Graphs in Fig. 5 depict the mean DR  value computed from 20 
numerical simulations versus the number of photon counts (Np ). The standard 
deviation of the whole set of simulations permits to estimate the corresponding error 
margin. DR  values approaching 1 indicate good discrimination between f x( )  and 
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f x( ) , while DR  results close to 0 correspond to recognition of the unauthorized signal 
as the sought image, thus leading to a wrong verification. Figure 5 also contains a 
dashed horizontal line corresponding to the established threshold level of DR = 0.5 . By 
analysing the results depicted in Figure 5, the number of photons can be more 
significantly decreased in the case of procedure I - PhCI+DRPE (Fig. 5(a)), limiting the 
number of photons of the primary image while keeping a satisfactory recognition 
process. For such a case, higher values of k  provide better DR  results. However, wider 
correlation peaks were obtained, making the detection of the sought signal more 
difficult [1]. A good trade-off between the number of photons and the applied 
nonlinearity is the pair Np = 102.5  (0.12%) and k = 0.3 , for which DR > 0.7  is 
achieved. If we consider the procedure II - DRPE+PhCI (Fig. 5(b)), the reduction of the 
number of photons is less important than in the previous case, and rather similar 
performance of the DR  is obtained for the tested k  values. However, intermediate low 
values of k  are preferable since they provide slightly better DR  with sharper and more 
intense correlation peaks. For this case, Np = 104  (3.8%) and k = 0.3  were chosen 
because they have a good recognition result with DR > 0.8 . 
A different type of binary primary image was tested in order to discard a significant 
influence of the primary image on the verification results. For instance, a dithered 
natural image was alternatively used in the experiment (Figure 6). The dithered image 
was built so that its number of white and black pixels strongly matches the binary text 
and, as a result, they both have approximately the same energy. A non-authorized 
dithered signal is built by symmetrically rotating the original natural image in the 
horizontal direction. Both integration approaches were considered. Results for the 
dithered natural image are shown in Figure 7. As a general rule, results for binary texts 
and dithered grey level images do not differ qualitatively, and equivalent conclusions 
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can be extracted from their study. However, it is remarkable that dithered natural 
images permit a larger reduction on the number of photons while keeping and 
acceptably good performance in the verification of the information through correlation. 
For the photon-limited version of the primary image (procedure I - PhCI+DRPE in Fig. 
2), Np = 101.75  (0.02% of image pixels) provides good results, whereas for the photon-
limited encrypted distribution (procedure II - DRPE+PhCI in Fig. 2), Np = 103.5  (1.2%) 
has a satisfactory performance. Both results correspond to lower photon counts in 
comparison to the results achieved for the binary text image of Figure 5. According to 
graphs presented in Fig. 7, and in accordance to Fig. 5, the value of k = 0.3  is a good 
trade-off between DR  and peak sharpness and it will be considered for other numerical 
experiments presented in the paper. 
 
3.3 Phase information compression 
Regarding both integrating combinations presented in the paper, procedure II - 
DRPE+PhCI presents the additional advantage of reducing the amount of information 
that it is needed to be sent, since the decrypted distribution has a sparse representation 
that strongly reduces the number of pixels with no-null information. However, taking 
into account that the encrypted distribution is of complex nature, both amplitude and 
phase must be kept for decryption. Let us remind that, after applying the photon-
counting imaging technique to the encrypted distribution, the amplitude information 
turns to be a binary distribution, whereas the phase information corresponding to the 
non-zero amplitude pixels is kept between 0,2π[ ]  with its maximum resolution of 8 
bits. Further compression can be achieved if we limit the number of bits used for 
representing the phase information [22-24]. In this work, the limitation of the number of 
bits is done according to the proposal presented in [24]. 
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Figure 8 shows the verification results in terms of DR  for both the binary text and the 
dithered natural images. Curves depicted in Figure 8 show a similar behaviour except 
for the case of binary representation of the phase. In general, there is a limiting number 
of photons Np  for which the two compared images are no longer discriminated. Above 
this number of pixels, the verification system presents satisfactory results (Np = 104  or 
equivalently 3.8% of the pixels for text image and Np = 103.5  or 1.2% of the pixels for 
dithered natural image). Results on the number of photon counts coincide with the ones 
obtained for 8 bit resolution in previous tests (Fig. 5 and 7) and do not significantly vary 
when the representation of the phase information is reduced to just 2 bits (or 
equivalently 4 phase values). For the case of considering just one bit for the 
reproduction of the phase distribution (that is, 2 phase values) the verification system is 
not able to discriminate between very similar images, independently of the number of 
photons.  
It is worth to mention that the photon-counting double-random-phase encryption 
presented in this paper, which allows the verification of the encrypted information and 
its discrimination from very similar but non-authorized signals, permits a stronger 
reduction in the number of bits (just 2 bits) in comparison to the results shown in Refs. 
[22-23]. In these papers, the quality needs in the reconstruction of 3D objects from 
digital holograms required at least 4-5 bits to obtain an intense correlation peak between 
the compressed and the uncompressed reconstructed images and about 6-7 bits to 
visualize a good 3D object reconstruction. The analysis of the results in [22-23] 
demonstrated that the speckle noise present in the reconstructed objects significantly 
affected the quality of the retrieved 3D object.  
 
 
	   15	  
4. Image verification and retrieval 
In this test, we combine natural images along with some binary text to build a more 
general primary image.  We want to show the feasibility of the proposed methods to 
encrypt and verify the information, but also to introduce the possibility of image 
retrieval from the correlation output result. In such a way, the proposed methods, which 
were not initially intended for visualization, will also permit information retrieval as 
other commonly used optical encryption methods. 
Images used in the experiment are separately shown in Figure 9. The database consists 
of three different animal pictures (named A1, A2 and A3) and three different texts 
(denoted as T1, T2 and T3). Image of the bear (A1) along with the "black-bear" text 
(T1) on its bottom area is used as primary image. Other images are considered in order 
to test the discrimination capability of the verification system. 
Following the procedures described in Section 3.1, the two approaches for integration of 
photon-counting imaging and DRPE method are analysed. Firstly, procedure I - 
PhCI+DRPE (Fig. 2) is applied and a photon-limited version fph x( )  of the primary 
image f x( )  is obtained with Np = 103.5  (1.2% of pixels). Then, the sparse information 
is encrypted, ψ x( ) . By using the appropriate decrypting key, the decoded image 
d fph x( )  is obtained (Figure 10(a)). This decrypted image is compared to all the images 
of the database (Fig. 9) by nonlinear correlation. According to previous results, 
parameter k  is set to 0.3.  Figure 10(b) shows the obtained results. The normalized 
intensity correlation outputs are shown in the same order of database pictures in Figure 
9. Only two intense and sharp peaks point out on the correlation planes obtained for the 
bear image (A1) and the black-bear text (T1). The location of the peaks corresponds to 
the center of the objects being correlated as it can be noticed by the axes coordinates. 
All the other correlation planes have a low intensity noisy background without any 
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remarkable peak. According to these correlation outputs, taking into account the peak 
intensity and location, the verification system can also synthesize the retrieved image 
with the elements of the scene correctly placed to the final user, as depicted in Figure 
10(c). 
If the second integration approach (procedure II - DRPE+PhCI in Fig. 2) is used, similar 
results are obtained. Figure 11 shows the obtained results. The primary image f x( )  is 
first encrypted, ψ x( ) . Photon-counting imaging techniques are applied to the complex-
valued encrypted distribution, and function ψ ph x( )  is generated with Np = 104.5  (12% 
of pixels). By using the correct key, the decrypted image dψ ph x( )  is obtained (Fig. 
11(a)). This output is compared to each image of the database through nonlinear 
correlation with k = 0.3 . Results are shown in Figure 11(b). From them, only two 
correlation peaks are obtained for the bear image and text. The other images of the 
database give low-intensity correlation outputs. These results indicate that the retrieved 
image consist of two objects of the database centred at the position of the intensity 
correlation peaks, so it coincides with the image displayed in Figure 10(c). 
 
5. Conclusions 
The introduction of photon-counting imaging techniques to encryption algorithms 
allows the generation of sparse distributions, which may permit bandwidth reduction, 
and increases the robustness security against intruder attacks. 
Two different procedures are considered depending on the order of the application of 
the two methods to be integrated. First, a photon counting version of a primary image 
can be obtained prior to its encryption (procedure I - PhCI+DRPE in Fig. 2), or vice 
versa, a sparse representation of encrypted distribution can be obtained by applying 
photon-counting imaging (procedure II - DRPE+PhCI in Fig. 2). Both procedures allow 
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us to increase security of the encryption system against intruders. However, the 
information in the decoded image is sufficient to verify the primary data by pattern 
recognition such as nonlinear correlation. In general, the number of photons can be 
reduced more significantly for the first approach (procedure I - PhCI+DRPE) that is, 
when a photon-counting version of the primary image is considered, than for the second 
case (procedure II - DRPE+PhCI) using a photon-counting imaging applied to the 
encrypted data. However, a substantial and effective bandwidth reduction is only 
achieved by using the procedure II - DRPE+PhCI.  Numerical results are presented for 
different types of images, such as text or dithered natural images to illustrate the 
performance of the proposed approaches. Not only has information verification been 
demonstrated but also retrieval of the original image has been achieved based on the 
correlation output results. 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1. (a) Primary image f x( )  of 512x512 pixel size. (b) Photon-limited versions of  
f x( )  for different photon counts, Np . The percentage of photons with respect to the 
original pixel size is given in brackets.  
Figure 2. Block diagram of two alternative procedures for combining the photon-
counting imaging technique with the encryption method: procedure I - PhCI +DRPE 
and procedure II - DRPE+PhCI. 
Figure 3. (a) Decrypted image d fph x( )  retrieved from the encrypted photon-limited 
primary function with Np = 102.5  (0.12%). (b) Decrypted image dψ ph x( )  obtained from 
the photon-limited encrypted distribution with Np = 104  (3.8%). 
Figure 4. Intensity correlation outputs for binary texts used as authorized f x( )  and 
non-authorized  
f x( )  signals. Both procedures for integrating photon counting imaging 
techniques and DRPE method are applied. The I - PhCI+DRPE procedure is obtained 
with Np = 102.5  (0.12%) and k = 0.3 . The II - DRPE+PhCI approach is applied with 
Np = 104  (3.8%) and k = 0.3 . 
Figure 5. DR  versus Np  for the results corresponding to the primary binary text. 
Different values of k  are analyzed for the nonlinear correlation. Integration procedure 
considers: (a) I – PhCI+DRPE; and (b) II – DRPE+PhCI. 
Figure 6. Top: Dithered natural image used for the experiments. Bottom: (left) An 
enlarged area of the original grey level picture, (Right) the same area of the dithered 
version. 
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Figure 7. DR  versus Np  for the results corresponding to the primary dithered natural 
image. Different values of k  are analyzed for the nonlinear correlation. Integration 
procedure considers: (a) I – PhCI+DRPE; and (b) II – DRPE+PhCI. 
Figure 8. DR  versus Np  for (a) binary and (b) natural primary images. Nonlinear 
correlation with k = 0.3  is applied. Different number of phase values (PV ) is 
considered for the reproduction of the phase information of the photon-limited version 
of the encrypted distribution. Integration procedure considers II – DRPE+PhCI. 
Figure 9. Database used in the work for information verification and image retrieval. 
Picture A1 along with text T1 are combined to built the primary image for the 
experiment. 
Figure 10. (a) Decrypted image d fph x( )  with Np = 103.5  (1.2% of the image pixels). (b) 
Intensity correlation outputs when Fig. 10(a) is nonlinearly correlated ( k = 0.3 ) with the 
whole database (Fig. 9). (c) Retrieved image corresponding to the correlation peak 
intensity and location obtained in (b). 
Figure 11. (a) Decrypted image dψ ph x( )  with Np = 104.5  (12% of the image pixels). (b) 
Intensity correlation outputs when Fig. 11(a) is nonlinearly correlated ( k = 0.3 ) with the 
whole database (Fig. 9). 
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